We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the. The seminal papers of alchian and demstez 1972 and jensen and meckling 1976, describe the. Agency theory jensen and meckling 1976 free download as powerpoint presentation. Jensen and meckling 1976 refers to the costs that arise. Manajerial behaviour, agency cost, and ownership structure, journal of financial and economics, 3.
Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure agency costs of outside equity in this paper managerial behavior, agency costs and the ownership structure are modelled. A significant paper published in 1976 by michael jensen and william meckling identified elements from the theory of agency in their consideration of the theory of the firm. This happens because managers tend to try to give priority to private interests. Volume 3, issue 4, october 1976, pages 305360 theory of the firm. Jensen dan meckling 1976 menjelaskan hubungan keagenan sebagai agency relationship as a contract under which one or more person the principals engage another person the agent to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure jensen, m. Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, journal of financial economics 3 1976 305360. This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency. Agency theory jensen and meckling 1976 provided an early articulation of agency theory and the principalagent problem between a shareholder and the manager who is expected to act on the shareholders behalf, but often does not. Agency costs and ownership structure the seminal contributions of jensen and meckling 1976 on agency costs have called into attention the social and private costs of an agents actions due to.
We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the separation. In agency theory terms, the owners are principals and the managers are agents and there is an agency loss which is the extent to which returns to the residual claimants, the owners, fall below what they would be if the principals, the owners, exercised direct control of the corporation jensen and meckling 1976. The starting point for the analysis is the agency theory by jensen and meckling 1976, which predicts that higher levels of managerial ownership structure. Jensen and meckling 1976 refers to the costs that arise due to the use of an agent by a principal in an agency relationship as agency cost. In barzel 1982s theory of the firm, drawing on jensen and meckling 1976, the firm emerges as a means of centralising monitoring and thereby avoiding costly redundancy in that function since in a firm the responsibility for monitoring can be centralised in a way that it cannot if production is organised as a group of workers each acting. This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of. Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Jensen and meckling 1976 identify three agency costs for principals to monitor agent behaviour. These costs include 1 the costs of opportunistic behaviour by the agent such as when the agent places his own selfinterest over that of the principals, 2 the costs to the principal of monitoring the agent. Organizations have grown to a large size because their capital requirements are greater than can be serviced by individuals. The jensen and meckling 1976, hereinafter jm theory explains.
Jensen and meckling 1976 initiated and developed it. Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure by. The starting point for the analysis is the agency theory by jensen and meckling 1976, which predicts that higher levels of managerial ownership structure increase. Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. The striking insight of alchian and demsetz 1972 and jensen and meckling 1976 is in viewing the firm as a set of contracts among factors of production. Agency theory and ownership structure estimating the. The key insight of jensen and meckling 1976 was to model the relationship between own ers and managers similar to one between a principal and an agent.
Sections 2 and 4 provide analyses of the agency costs of equity and debt respectively. Michael jenson and william meckling introduction and summary 1. Agency and firms ownership structure focus is on the relationship between upperlevel management and stockholders categories which overlap when the owner is the manager. Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure author links open overlay panel michael c. Because the two parties have different interests and the agent has more information, the principal cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its the principals best interests. For a claim on the firm of 1a the outsider will pay only 1a times the value he expects the firm to have given the induced change in the behavior of the ownermanager. This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm.
Jensen and meckling 1976 quote from adam smith 1776. Jensen and meckling 19 1976 owner s response to the changed incentives, the buyer will not pay 1. Agency theory was developed by jensen and meckling 1976. The notion of the agency theory is widely used in economics, finance, marketing, legal, and social sciences. Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure jensen and meckling 1976 presentation by emma xu and michael farrell october 12 2015. Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party the principal delegates work to another the agent, who performs that work. They suggested a theory of how the governance of a company is based on the conflicts of interest between the companys owners shareholders, its managers and major providers of debt finance.
Taxpayers and tax authorities have different interests. In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of 1 property rights, 2 agency, and 3 finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm. Jensen and meckling 1976 put forward the theory of the agency, explained that the interests of management and shareholder interests often conflict, so that conflicts can arise between them. This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure. The modern literature on the problem dates back at least to berle and means 1932. Analisis hubungan struktur dan indeks corporate governance dengan kualitas pengungkapan. The notion of the contract is used here as a metaphor to describe the agency relationships jensen and meckling, 1976 and it is designed based on the outcome. Agency theory revolves around the issue of the agency problem and its solution.
Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure jensen and meckling, jfe, 1976 about 3400. Contemporary applications of agency theory were advanced with the publication of theory of the firm. Jensen meckling agency theory presentation luoma slideshare. Agency theory jensen and meckling 1976 stocks debt. Fligstein and freeland 1995 argue that the most efficient contract used to govern the principalagent relationship is determined by agency theory. Jensen and mecklings famous article on agency costs analyzed by tero luoma. Jensens and mecklings 1976 model shows that agency problems exist, when there. The firm is a black box operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits. See meckling 1976 for a discussion of the fundamental importance of the assumption of resourceful, evaluative, maximizing behavior on the part of individuals in the development of theory. Each of these groups has different interests and objectives.
It explains how best to organise relationships in which one party principal determines the work and which another party agent performs or makes decisions on behalf of the principal jensen and meckling, 1976. Meckling 1922 may 15, 1998 was an american economist and professor of management and government policy and dean at the simon business school, university of rochester, working in the areas of managerial economics and the economic analysis of law, and his work received international recognition source. Received january 1976, revised version received july 1976 this paper integrates elements from the theory of agency. Simon school, university of rochester deceased date written.
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